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Abstract
Content-based image retrieval (CBIR) is one of the fundamental image retrieval primitives. Its applications can be found in
various areas, such as art collections and medical diagnoses. With an increasing prevalence of cloud computing paradigm, image
owners desire to outsource their images to cloud servers. In order to deal with the risk of privacy leakage of images, images are
typically encrypted before they are outsourced to the cloud, which makes CBIR an extremely challenging task. Existing studies
focus on the scenario with only a single image owner, leaving the problem of CBIR with multiple image sources (i.e., owners)
unaddressed.
In this paper, we propose a secure CBIR scheme that supports Multiple Image owners with Privacy Protection (MIPP). We
encrypt image features with a secure multi-party computation technique, which allows image owners to encrypt image features
with their own keys. This enables efficient image retrieval over images gathered from multiple sources, while guaranteeing that
image privacy of an individual image owner will not be leaked to other image owners. We also propose a new method for similarity
measurement of images that can avoid revealing image similarity information to the cloud. Theoretical analysis and experimental
results demonstrate that MIPP achieves retrieval accuracy and efficiency simultaneously, while preserving image privacy.
Keywords: Secure Image Retrieval, Multi-Source, Privacy Preserving, Searchable Encryption, Content-Based Image Retrieval,
Image Encryption
1. Introduction
Recent years have witnessed the prosperity of image-sharing
services and applications (e.g., Instagram), which results in an
increasing demand for image retrieval. In early years, text-
based image retrieval systems implemented by manual tagging
image properties could fulfill the requirement of image retrieval.
With the growing popularity of Internet users, hundreds of mil-
lions of images appear on the Internet per second, the tradi-
tional text-based image retrieval becomes gradually impracti-
cal, because it consumes prohibitive manpower and financial re-
sources for labeling.. Content-based image retrieval (CBIR) [1–
3] has been proposed for real world applications which uses the
image feature extracted automatically from images, such as col-
ors [4, 5], textures [6, 7], and shapes [8, 9].
In general, higher resolution images consume more storage.
For instance, a photo taken by a cell phone in present days may
be about 2MB and the one taken by a professional camera may
reach 10MB or more. With an increasing prevalence of cloud
computing and storage [10, 11], migrating services to the cloud
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has rapidly become a trend for mass data storage and manage-
ment. By outsourcing images to the cloud, service providers
can make their services easily accessible to geographically dis-
tributed users by only requiring them to pay for the computation
and storage resources they actually use.
Outsourcing images directly to cloud servers, however, in-
creases the risk of privacy leakage when images contain sensi-
tive information, such as patient’s medical information or per-
sonal location information. For instance, a compromised cloud
vendor could enable access to the outsourced images by unau-
thorized users. In order to protect images against privacy leak-
age threats, images are usually encrypted before being outsourced
to the cloud. Since encryption operations disrupt the image
content, it becomes a challenging task to perform CBIR over
encrypted images. Therefore, it is highly desirable to devise
a privacy-preserving CBIR system for cloud-based encrypted
image sets.
Many schemes have been proposed in the field of secure
CBIR [12–22], which can be roughly classified into two cate-
gories. In the first category, image owners extract features from
plain images, and then outsource both the encrypted images and
the encrypted image features to the cloud. In the second cate-
gory, image owners outsource only the encrypted images to the
cloud that is responsible for extracting features from encrypted
images and for conducting retrieval operations.
Existing studies have a common limitation that they con-
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sider only a single-source case (i.e., a single image owner). In
real-world applications, however, image retrieval is more likely
to get multiple image sources involved. For instance, consider a
cloud-based e-health application, which takes an encrypted ul-
trasonic medical image of an undiagnosed patient as input and
searches for similar confirmed cases from a collection of en-
crypted medical images. Suppose images are collected from
multiple hospitals (i.e., sources), each of which is reluctant and
unpermitted to share with one another the plain medical images.
The existing schemes can be easily extended to the multi-source
scenario by performing retrieval over encrypted images of dif-
ferent owners one by one. Although simple and straightforward,
it introduces multiple rounds of communications between users
and individual image owners, and thereby becomes inefficient
in terms of retrieval time and communication overhead.
There are several challenges in designing a secure and ef-
ficient CBIR scheme with multiple image owners. First, we
should ensure the privacy of images and image features of dif-
ferent image owners. Second, the authorized query user should
communicate his secret image encryption key with image own-
ers for generating a secret query in secure image retrieval schemes.
However, when secure image retrieval schemes have multiple
image owners, each image owner should use their own secret
image encryption key to encrypt images and image features.
Then, the authorized query user should communicate his secret
image encryption key with each image owner for generating a
secret query, which will increase the communication overload
in schemes. It is desirable to address this problem in the secure
image retrieval scheme with multiple image owners. Finally,
when the cloud executes image retrieval, it may obtain similar-
ity relation information of images in the retrieval result. This
privacy issue should be also addressed.
In this paper, we propose the MIPP, a novel content-based
multi-source image retrieval scheme with privacy protection.
MIPP operates in the same way as existing schemes in the first
category, which outsources encrypted images along with their
encrypted image features to the cloud. In order to address the
challenges of supporting multiple image owners, we first en-
crypt images with a key stream and encrypt the corresponding
image features by the secure multi-party computation method,
and then propose a novel method to measure the image similar-
ity; this can help to avoid revealing the image similarity infor-
mation in cloud to a certain extent.
The main contributions in this paper are highlighted as fol-
lows:
• We design a MIPP, which, to the best of our knowledge,
is the first scheme belonging to the first category that
enables content-based multi-source image retrieval with
privacy protection. In the proposed MIPP, multiple im-
age owners are allowed to encrypt images and image fea-
tures by their unique secret image encryption keys. This
enables an efficient image retrieval over images gathered
from multiple sources, while providing guarantees that
image privacy of an individual image owner will not be
leaked to other image owners. Thus, the proposed MIPP
can meet the practical requirements in real-world appli-
cations.
• We present a new approach to measure the similarity of
images, which can avoid the leakage of image similarity
information in retrieval results. Extensive experimental
results show that the resulting retrieval outcome is com-
parable to that with the typical Euclidean distance crite-
rion.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We summa-
rize the related work in Section 2 and introduce the preliminar-
ies in Section 3. In Section 4, we present the system model,
thread model, and design goals of our scheme. We detail the
design of MIPP in Section 5 and present the security analy-
sis in Section 6. We evaluate the performance of the proposed
scheme in Section 7 and conclude this paper in Section 8.
2. Related work
In this section, we will present a brief overview of existing
research schemes in the field of secure image retrieval.
Homomorphic encryption is a form of encryption that al-
lows computations to be carried out on ciphertext, thus gen-
erating an encrypted result which, when decrypted, matches
the result of operations performed on the plaintext. Zhang et
al. [12, 13] leveraged the property of homomorphic encryption
in secure image retrieval. The homomorphic encryption results
in high computational complexity that makes it consume too
much time. Xia et al. [14] proposed a secure CBIR scheme with
Bag-of-Words model and Earth Movers Distance. The retrieval
index was constructed by locality-sensitive hashing. In this
scheme, the user and image owner have two times of two-way
communications, which results in high communication over-
head. Yuan et al. [15] proposed a scheme named SEISA with
access control and secure k-means outsource, dynamically up-
dating images is supported. Yuan et al. [16] proposed a scheme
that can explore user relationship while preserving image pri-
vacy. The secure index and encrypted image features were con-
structed by an entity called SF rather the image owner. This
scheme supports dynamic updates of images without affecting
the current social structure. The scheme proposed by Xia et
al. [17] was able to deter the illegal distribution of images while
preserving the image privacy. Li et al. [18] proposed a privacy
preserving retrieval scheme for outsourced media, which used
the one-way hash along with encrypting partly hash values to
encrypt image features. This scheme created trade offs among
privacy preserving, retrieval quality, and complexity through
adjusting the bit counts of encryption in the hash value.
In the second category, Ferreira et al. [19] proposed a scheme
IES-CBIR that can extract image features from encrypted im-
ages. The texture and color features were encrypted separately;
the color feature was encrypted by scrambling pixels in HSV
color model and the texture feature is encrypted by shuffling
rows and columns in images. This scheme enabled dynamic up-
dates of images by using Bag-Of-Visual-Words model. Zhang
et al. [20] proposed a histogram-based retrieval scheme for en-
crypted JPEG images with machine learning. They encrypted
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images by permuting DCT and the server to retrieve the his-
togram at each frequency position from encrypted images. Cheng
et al. [21] proposed a markov process based retrieval scheme for
encrypted JPEG images. Markov’s process models of the AC
coefficients and the server could extract features from the tran-
sition probability matrices of those AC coefficients of encrypted
images. Zhang et al. [22] proposed an encrypted medical image
retrieval algorithm based on DWT-DCT frequency domain. In
this algorithm, features were extracted from encrypted images.
As described in Section 1, these schemes may lead to heavy
communication overload and privacy leakage (e.g., image fea-
tures and image similarity) when simply extended for CBIR
with multiple image owners.
3. Preliminary
In this section, we will introduce the preliminaries, includ-
ing image features used in this paper and the secure multi-party
computation.
3.1. Image feature
MPEG-7 [23, 24] standard is the multi-media content de-
scription interface that contains a set of descriptors. We ex-
tract the Edge Histogram Descriptor (EHD) from images for
our secure CBIR scheme. Edge Histogram Description is a
non-homogenous texture descriptor in MPEG-7 which captures
spatial distribution of edges and works well in CBIR.
3.2. Secure multi-party computation
Assume that there are multiple parties, each of which owns
a secret number. Each party expects to obtain the total number
of all parties, without publicizing their own number to others.
Thus, each participant needs to encrypt his number before mak-
ing it public. The secure multi-party computation can calculate
over encrypted numbers, which meets the above requirement.
Under the background of the secure multi-party computation
technology, we can obtain the sum or product of numbers in the
same manner as calculating under plain number. Nowadays,
secure multi-party computation has been applied in many real-
world applications, such as secure voting and secure electronic
auction.
Jung et al. [25] proposed a privacy-preserving sum calcula-
tion scheme with collusion-tolerable, without the need for se-
cure channels. This scheme can effectively calculate the sum of
encrypted numbers, which can be briefly described as follows.
Step 1: Select two large prime numbers p and q with the
same length where q divides p − 1.
Step 2: Define the q-order cyclic multiplicative group G1
with a generator being defined in Equation (1), where h is a
random number in Zp. And define the q-order multiplicative
group G2, where its generator is defined in Equation (2).
g1 = h(p−1)/q mod p s.t. g1 , 1 mod p (1)
g2 = g
p
1 mod p
2 (2)
Step 3: Each participant Pi randomly chooses a number
ri ∈ Zq and calculates a public number g2rimodp2. Then, she
exchanges the number g2ri ∈ G2 with Pi−1 and Pi+1. Pi can
calculate a secret number Ri ∈ G2 as shown in Equation (3)
and the ciphertext Ci as shown in Equation (4) after a round of
exchanges.
Ri = (g
ri+1
2 /g
ri−1
2 )
ri (3)
Ci = (1 + xip)Ri mod p2 (4)
Step 4: Each Pi shares her ciphertext Ci with other partici-
pants and calculates the product of all ciphertexts according to
Equation (5) to obtain the value of C.
C =
n∏
i=1
Ci mod p2
=
n∏
i=1
(1 + xip)(g
ri+1
2 /g
ri−1
2 )
ri mod p2
= (1 + p
n∑
i=1
xi)g
∑n
i=1 ri+1ri−riri−1
2 mod p
2 (5)
= (1 + p
n∑
i=1
xi) mod p2
Step 5: The sum of all numbers can be obtained by calcu-
lating Equation (6).
(C − 1)/p =
n∑
i=1
xi mod p (6)
4. Problem Formulation
In this section, we will introduce the system model, threat
model, and design goals of our scheme.
4.1. System model
There are four types of entities in our secure multi-source
CBIR system, including multiple image owners, authorized query
users, the cloud, and a key management center (KMC), as illus-
trated in Fig. 1. The description of each type of entity is detailed
as follows.
• Multiple images owners: They are providers of image
databases denoted by Image Owner i (i ∈ [1,N]) in Fig. 1.
We assume that each image owner has a secure channel
to communicate his secret key with KMC.
• Authorized query users: They are users authorized by
specific image owners and have the authority to send im-
age retrieval requests to the cloud. We assume that autho-
rized query users in the system will not reveal their secret
image encryption key or distribute image retrieval results
to unauthorized users.
• Cloud: It takes responsibility for building secure retrieval
indexes and executing image retrieval. It stores encrypted
images, encrypted image features, information of image
owners, and a list of authorized query users. We as-
sume that the cloud is honest-but-curious, which means it
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Fig. 1. System Model of the Secure Multi-Source CBIR Scheme
will execute the image retrieval operation correctly, while
it may also analyze images or image features to obtain
some sensitive information about images.
• Key management center (KMC): It has three main func-
tionalities. First, it takes responsibility for storing secret
image encryption keys, information of image owners, au-
thorized query user lists received from image owners, and
storing the authorized query user’s secret image encryp-
tion key temporarily when there comes a query from an
authorized query user. Second, it will decrypt encrypted
image retrieval results from the cloud, and then encrypt
these images with the secret image encryption key of the
authorized query user. Finally, it will send the new en-
crypted image retrieval results to the cloud. In this paper,
we assume that the KMC is fully trusted that it will not
reveal secret image encryption keys of image owners and
authorized query users to others.
The workflow of our scheme is described as follows:
(1) Multiple image owners extract the EHD feature to repre-
sent an image, then they encrypt their images and image
features respectively. After that, they outsource encrypted
images and encrypted image features along with their iden-
tity to the cloud. The authorized user list will also be sent
to the cloud for the image retrieval service, shown as 1© in
Fig. 1. They also need to send secret image encryption keys
that is used to encrypt images to the KMC through a secure
channel, shown as 2© in Fig. 1. Image owners need not store
secret keys that is used to encrypt image features. When a
new image owner arrives, the above operations should be
repeated.
(2) Before an authorized user requests a query, he/she will ex-
tract EHD features from query images and encrypt query
image features, then submit the generated encrypted query
to the cloud for image retrieval operation, shown as 3© in
Fig. 1. At the same time, he should send his secret im-
age encryption key to the KMC through a secure channel,
shown as 4© in Fig. 1. For each retrieval request, the image
encryption key that the authorized query user sends to the
KMC should be different from the last time he retrieved.
After receiving retrieval results from cloud, the authorized
query user decrypts retrieval results with his own image en-
cryption key, which is the same as the key sent to the KMC.
Finally, the authorized query user can sort the decrypted re-
trieval results to get top-h similar images.
(3) After receiving encrypted images and image features from
image owners, the cloud will build the retrieval index. When
an image retrieval request arrives, he should verify the iden-
tity of query user. Then, it will execute an image retrieval
operation if verified successfully. When it obtains retrieval
results, it will send the encrypted retrieval results to the
KMC instead of sending the retrieval results to the autho-
rized query user, shown as 5© in Fig. 1. At the same time,
information of the authorized query user will also be sent to
the KMC along with the corresponding encrypted retrieval
results.
(4) When the KMC receives encrypted images from cloud, it
will decrypt these images with image owners’ secret image
encryption key first. Then, it will encrypt these images with
the secret image encryption key of the related authorized
query user. After that, the re-encrypted images will be sent
to the cloud, shown as 6© in Fig. 1.
(5) Cloud will return the re-encrypted image retrieval results
that is received from the KMC to the authorized query user,
shown as 7© in Fig. 1.
4.2. Threat model
In our scheme, we consider the following two kinds of threads:
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(1) Eavesdroppers.
In the process of image transmission (e.g., sending encrypted
images and their features to the cloud, and fetching retrieval
results from the KMC, the KMC sending re-encrypted im-
ages to the cloud, and the cloud providing retrieval results
to the authorized query user), eavesdroppers may eavesdrop
image information. This is a weak adversary that can be de-
fended by encryption.
(2) Cloud.
In our scheme, we assume the cloud is honest-but-curious.
It will correctly execute the image retrieval operation, but it
may analyze image content through encrypted images with
their features at the same time. Thus, we should guarantee
the data privacy in the process of encrypting images and im-
age features. Additionally, the cloud may obtain the sim-
ilarity relation information of images over the process of
secure image retrieval. We should avoid this kind of image
privacy leakage in cloud.
4.3. Design goals
In this section, we describe design goals of our scheme as
follows.
(1) Image privacy.
Image privacy is very important in secure image retrieval
service. We should unable the cloud and unauthorized users
to obtain plain images and plain image features, along with
image similarity relation information through encrypted im-
ages, encrypted image features, the encrypted retrieval re-
sults.
(2) Retrieval accuracy.
The retrieval accuracy is an indispensable element in se-
cure image retrieval. In our scheme, we proposed a new
approach to manage the similarity of images. Therefore,
retrieval accuracy difference between our scheme and the
secure scheme retrieval with Euclidean distance should be
within reasonable limits.
(3) Efficiency.
Efficiency indicates the time consumption in a secure image
retrieval scheme. We should ensure high efficiency in our
scheme to enhance its practicality in real world application,
which means the time of encryption, index construction,
and retrieval should be reduced.
5. The design of MIPP
In this section, notations in our scheme are shown in the ta-
ble. We first introduce the system overview and then describe
the data encryption method. In order to solve the image simi-
larity leakage problem in the cloud, we propose a new method
to measure image similarity. The secure content-based image
retrieval, index construction, and index update method of our
scheme are also introduced in this section.
5.1. Notations in this section
Notations used in our scheme are described in Table 1.
5.2. System overview
There are four entities in our system, each with its own re-
sponsibility, described as follows.
• Image owner is the provider of image database. Each
image owner has his own image collection W. He will
extract EHD image features from W and get the image
feature collection F and FF. For preserving the privacy of
images and image features, he will generate a secret im-
age encryption key SK and run the ImageEnc algorithm
to get encrypted image collection EW first. Then, he
should generate secret image feature encryption keys and
run the ImageFeatureEnc process to get the encrypted
image feature collection EF and encrypted collection EFF.
Then EW, EF and EFF will be outsourced to the cloud
along with OID, AUL and AK through the network. Be-
sides, SK will also be sent to the KMC for storage through
a secure channel.
• The authorized user is the user who has the demand
of image retrieval. He will extract EHD features from
query images QW to obtain the query image feature col-
lection QF and run ImageFeatureEnc process to get the
encrypted image feature collection EQ firstly. Next, he
will make calculations to obtain the collection QWW and
EQQ. After that, he will generate a secret query Q = {EQ,
EQQ, UID, AK} and send Q to the cloud for secure image
retrieval. Finally, he will generate a secret image encryp-
tion key USK and send this key to KMC through a secret
channel. After receiving retrieval results from cloud, he
uses his own secret image encryption key USK and runs
the ImageDec algorithm to decrypt the result images ER,
then sort the result images to obtain top-h similar images
S = {s1, s2, ... , sh}.
• The cloud takes responsibility for storing and retrieving.
It will store EW, EF, OID, AUL and AK. Given a query, it
uses AK to verify query user’s identity in the AUL. If val-
idated successfully, it will run the ImageRetrieval pro-
cess to retrieve similar images in the image database. In-
stead of sending top-h encrypted retrieval results ER to
authorized query user directly, he sends ER and AK to
KMC firstly. After that, he will send NER that is received
from KMC to the authorized query user. Last, for im-
proving retrieval efficiency, it will run IndexConstruct
process to construct the retrieval index I.
• The KMC stores SK, AUL and temporarily stores USK.
After receiving ER and AK from cloud, it will run the
ImageDec algorithm to decrypt ER to obtain W, then it
uses the AK to obtain the secret image encryotion key of
the authorized query user and runs the ImageEnc algo-
rithm to encrypt W with this key to obtain NER. Finally,
it will send NER to the cloud. After it finish the above
operations, it can discard the USK of this query.
5.3. Data encryption
For preserving image privacy in the cloud, images and im-
age features should be encrypted before outsourcing to the cloud.
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Table 1
Notations Used in Our Scheme.
Notation Description
n The size of images and image features
u The size of query image and image features.
OID The identity of each image owner
AUL The authorized user list
SK The secret image encryption key of each image owner
USK The secret image encryption key of query user
UID The user id
AK The authentication key to verify query user’s identity
W = {w1,w2, ...,wn} The plain image collection of each image owner
F = {f1, f2, ..., fn} The plain image feature collection of each image owner
FF = {f12, f22, ..., fn2} The square image feature collection of each image owner
EW = {ew1, ew2, ..., ewn} The encrypted image collection of each image owner
EF = {ef1, ef2, ..., efn} The encrypted image feature collection of each image owner
EFF = {ef12, ef22, ..., efn2} The encrypted square image feature collection of each image owner
QW = {qw1, qw2, ..., qwu} The query image collection of each query user
QF = {qf1, qf2, ..., qfu} The query image feature collection of each query user
EQ = {eq1, eq2, ..., equ} The encrypted query image feature collection of each query user
QWW = {qf12, qf22, ..., qfu2} The square query image feature collection of each query user
EQQ = {eq12, eq22, ..., equ2} The encrypted square query image feature collection of each query user
S = {s1, s2, ..., sh}. The top-h retrieval results
ER = {er1, er2, ..., erh} The top-h encrypted retrieval results
NER = {ner1, ner2, ..., nerh} The re-encrypted retrieval results
We will introduce data encryption methods of our scheme in
this section, including key generation, image encryption, image
decryption, and image feature encryption method.
5.3.1. Key generation
Given a secret parameter k, run the KeyGen(1k) algorithm,
so image owners and authorized query users can obtain the se-
cret image encryption key SK and USK respectively, where the
length of SK and USK is at least the same as the total number
pixels in images and the numbers in SK and USK is between 0
and 255 inclusively.
5.3.2. ImageEnc&ImageDec - Image encryption and decryp-
tion
Given a secret key SK and an image collection W, image
owners run the ImageEnc(SK, W) algorithm to encrypt images,
shown as Algorithm 1. The authorized query user also runs
this algorithm to encrypt images with his secret key USK. In
our image encryption scheme, we use a standard key stream
to encrypt images which is secure against the Chosen-Plaintext
Attacks (CPA). Thus our image encryption scheme can protect
the privacy of image content.
After receiving NER from cloud, the user will run the Im-
ageDec(SK, EW) algorithm to decrypt images, shown as Algo-
rithm 2. The M and N in algorithm 1 and algorithm 2 are the
height and width of images. The KMC also uses this algorithm
to decrypt images.
5.3.3. ImageFeatureEnc - Image feature encryption
In order to preserve the privacy of image features, image
features should be encrypted before they are outsourced to the
cloud. Image owners and authorized query users both need to
Algorithm 1 ImageEnc(SK, W)
1: while j , M do
2: while k , N do
3: EW jk ⇐ S K j×N+k ⊕W jk;
4: k ⇐ k + 1;
5: end while
6: j⇐ j + 1;
7: end while
Algorithm 2 ImageDec(SK, EW)
1: while j , M do
2: while k , N do
3: W jk ⇐ S K j×N+k ⊕ EW jk;
4: k ⇐ k + 1;
5: end while
6: j⇐ j + 1;
7: end while
encrypt image features; they use the same method to encrypt
image features. For an image feature fi = {a1, a2, ... , al}, they
will first calculate the square of image feature fi to obtain fi2 =
{a12, a22, ... , al2} where l is the dimension of image feature fi.
We use the secure multi-party computation method introduced
in Section 3.2 to encrypt image features. The ImageFeatureEnc
process will be described in detail as follows.
First, similar to secure multi-party computation, they choose
q as a large primer number, whose length is the same as p, sat-
isfies that q divided by p-1. Then, they select a random number
h ∈ Zp and generate the g1 and g2 as Equation (1) and Equa-
tion (2).
Second, they randomly choose a number r j ∈ Zq and cal-
culate a number R j as Equation (3) for each dimension a j in
image feature fi.
Finally, they can get the cipertext ea j of each dimension a j
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in fi by calculating ea j = (1+a jp)R j mod p2. Then, the cipertext
of fi2 can be obtained by the same way. The encrypted feature
and encrypted square feature are shown as follows.
efi = {ea1, ea2, ... , eal} = {(1+a1p)R1 mod p2, (1+a2p)R2
mod p2, ... , (1+alp)Rl mod p2}.
efi2 = {ea12, ea22, ... , eal2}= {(1+a12p)R1 mod p2, (1+a22p)R2
mod p2, ... , (1+al2p)Rl mod p2}.
After encrypting all image features, they can obtain the en-
crypted feature collection EF and EFF.
It should be brought to attention that the parameter p is pub-
lic to all image owners, authorized query users, and cloud. Pa-
rameters q, h, and ri in the image feature encryption process
can be selected differently among image features. Image own-
ers and authorized users can select by themselves without com-
municating with others. Additionally, they do not need to store
it, which means these parameters can be discarded after using.
5.4. New approach to manage image similarity
In the field of image retrieval, the similarity of images is al-
ways measured by calculating the distance of image features.
If two images are similar, then the distance of them will be
very small. Euclidean distance is a type of distance that is
typically used to measure the similarity of images, shown as
Equation (7). It can calculate the similarity of images accu-
rately. While this will also lead to the problem that when using
it to measure the similarity of images in the cloud, the cloud
can obtain the image similarity relation information. In order
to solve this problem, we propose a new approach to manage
image similarity.
Given two image features X = {x1, x2, ... , xl} and Y = {y1, y2,
... , yl}, the distance NewDis between X and Y can be calculated
as Equation (8). Compared with Euclidean distance, we use∑u
i=1 xi/u and
∑u
i=1 yi/u to replace xi and yi respectively in the
third part of Equation (7).
EucDis =
√
(x1 − y1)2 + (x2 − y2)2 + ... + (xu − yu)2
=
√
u∑
i=1
x2i +
u∑
i=1
y2i −
u∑
i=1
2xiyi (7)
NewDis =
√
u∑
i=1
x2i +
u∑
i=1
y2i −
u∑
i=1
2
∑u
i=1 xi
u
∑u
i=1 yi
u
=
√
u∑
i=1
x2i +
u∑
i=1
y2i − 2u
∑u
i=1 xi
u
∑u
i=1 yi
u
(8)
=
√
u∑
i=1
x2i +
u∑
i=1
y2i − 2
∑u
i=1 xi
∑u
i=1 yi
u
The experimental results show that the accuracy and recall
rate of the proposed approach are comparable to the European
distance. In addition, the proposed approach can support multi-
source encrypted image retrieval. Therefore we used the pro-
posed approach to calculate the similarity between the images
in our scheme.
5.5. Secure content-based image retrieval
Before requesting a query, authorized query user should
generate a secret query Q = {EQ, EQQ, UID, AK}, and then
send Q to the cloud for image retrieving. After receiving Q
from authorized query user, the cloud first verifies whether this
user is authorized and which owner authorized this user. If val-
idated successfully, the cloud will retrieve in authorized images
in the image database through the retrieval index.
For image collection W and query image collection QW,
the similarity of image wi and image qw j can be measured by
calculating the distance between fi and qf j.
However, image collection and image feature collection in
the cloud are all encrypted. The similarities between image wi
and image qw j can be measured by calculating the distance be-
tween efi and eq j.
As image features are all encrypted by the secure multi-
party computation method, it is the same for the encrypted im-
age feature efi = {ea1, ea2, ... , eal} and encrypted query image
feature eq j = {eqa1, eqa2, ... , eqal} where l is the dimension
of image feature. The distance between them can be calculated
according to Equations (5), (6) and (9). We will describe them
as follows.
First, the cloud stores the encrypted image feature efi = {ea1,
ea2, ... , eal} and efi2 = {ea12, ea22, ... , eal2}. He will receive
the encrypted query image feature eq j = {eqa1, eqa2, ... , eqal}
and eq j2 = {eqa12, eqa22, ... , eqal2} from an authorized query
user. Then, he can get CEA, CEA2, CEQA, CEQA2 according
to Equation (5).
Second, we can obtain the
∑l
i=1 eai,
∑l
i=1 ea
2
i ,
∑l
i=1 eqai and∑l
i=1 eqa
2
i , shown as follows.
(CEA − 1)/p =
∑l
i=1
eai mod p
(CEA2 − 1)/p =
∑l
i=1
ea2i mod p
(CEQA − 1)/p =
∑l
i=1
eqai mod p
(CEQA2 − 1)/p =
∑l
i=1
eqa2i mod p
Finally, the distance Sim between efi and eq j can be ob-
tained by Equation 9. The similarity of images wi and image
qw j can be measured by this distance value, and the small dis-
tance value indicates that they are similar.
S im =
√√ l∑
i=1
ea2i +
l∑
i=1
eqa2i − 2
∑l
i=1 eai
∑l
i=1 eqai
l
(9)
However, there exists a problem during the distance calcula-
tion process. Ciphertexts in encrypted image features are very
large and the computation complexity of calculating the sum
is high, which will consume too much time. Therefore, con-
structing a retrieval index is very necessary for high retrieval
efficiency.
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5.6. Index construction
We will calculate the sum of encrypted elements
∑l
i=1 eai
and
∑l
i=1 ea
2
i in encrypted features by using the secure multi-
party computation during the distance computation process of
image features. However, cipertext eai and ea2i in the encrypted
feature are very large, which will results in the sum calculation
operation having high computation complexity and consuming
too much time. Therefore, we should build a retrieval index to
improve retrieval efficiency. Because the time mainly consumes
in computing the sum of cipertext in encrypted features, given
an encrypted image feature efi = {ea1, ea2, ... , eal}, we can
calculate
∑l
i=1 eai,
∑l
i=1 ea
2
i in advance and then store them in
the retrieval index table, shown as Table 2.
Given an encrypted query image feature eq j = {eqa1, eqa2,
. . ., eqal}, the cloud only needs to calculate∑li=1 eqai,∑li=1 eqa2i
and then get
∑l
i=1 eai,
∑l
i=1 ea
2
i from index table when executing
encrypted image retrieval. The sum of ciphertexts in encrypted
feature is computed in advance which will save much time in
the retrieval process and the retrieval efficiency of our scheme
is improved.
5.7. Images and Index update in cloud
Sometimes image owners may add images to the cloud or
delete images from the cloud. When, images in the cloud are
changed, image features will also be changed. Images in the
retrieval index should be in accord with images in the cloud,
therefore the retrieval index should be modified when images
in the cloud are changed. Our scheme supports the dynamic
updating of images and index in the cloud including update,
delete, and add operation.
(1) Add operation.
When an image owner requests the cloud to add some im-
ages for him, he should send encrypted images and en-
crypted image features to the cloud. Then, cloud will store
these new images and image features in the image database.
After that, the cloud will calculate the related data
∑l
i=1 eai
and
∑l
i=1 ea
2
i of encrypted image features and add these two
data along with OID, image id into the index table.
(2) Delete operation.
When an image owner wants to delete images in the cloud,
he should send the image IDs to the cloud. If there are
image IDs that belong to this image owner, the cloud will
delete these images from the index table. The cloud will
also delete encrypted images and the corresponding encrypted
image features.
(3) Update operation.
For preserving the image privacy, an image owner may re-
encrypt his images, image features, and then update these
images in the cloud. When an image owner requests to
update images, the cloud should delete the stale encrypted
images and image features using the image IDs. Then, the
cloud adds these re-encrypted images and their image fea-
tures into the image database. Since updating encrypted
image features will not change the
∑l
i=1 eai and
∑l
i=1 ea
2
i ,
there is no need to update the index table.
6. Security analysis
In this section, we will analyze the security of our scheme,
including data privacy and image similarity leakage in the cloud.
6.1. Data privacy
In our scheme, data privacy contains the privacy of im-
age content, image features and image similarity information
in cloud. We will analyze these three kinds of privacy in the
following subsections.
6.1.1. Image Content Privacy
As described in Section 5.2.2, the image owner generates
a secret key SK to encrypt images. The image owner does not
want unauthorized user(e.g., cloud, adversary or others) to ob-
tain his image content; he will not reveal his secret key to unau-
thorized user. In our scheme, the image owner needs to store
his secret key in the KMC. We assume the KMC is fully trusted
and will not reveal secret keys to unauthorized user. At the
same time, we assume the authorized query user will not reveal
his secret image encryption key to unauthorized user and will
not send image retrieval results to unauthorized user. For the
privacy of images outsourced in the cloud, our scheme supports
dynamically updating images in the cloud, which means that
image owners can re-encrypt images and then outsource these
re-encrypted images to the cloud to replace the stale encrypted
images. This operation further enhances the privacy protection
of images in the cloud. Once an unauthorized user obtains the
key of an image owner, he can only crack images of this image
owner for a certain period of time, and if the image owner up-
dates his encrypted images in the cloud, this unauthorized user
will be unable to crack these re-encrypted images. For the pri-
vacy of the image retrieval results, the authorized query user
should send a secret image encryption key that is different from
his previous query to the KMC for each of his query. Once an
unauthorized user obtain the secret image encryption of an au-
thorized query user, he can only crack retrieval results of this
user for this query time which enhance the image privacy pro-
tection. Since image owners, authorized query users and the
KMC will not reveal the secret image encryption key to others,
unauthorized users are unabled to obtain secret image encryp-
tion keys and they are also unable to obtain plain image content
through image owners, authorized query users or the KMC.
In the existing researches, the cloud returns encrypted re-
trieval results to authorized query users directly. If we also
adopt this strategy, once the unauthorized user obtains one im-
age owner’s secret image encryption key, then he can brute
force encrypted image retrieval results to obtain the plain im-
age contents. This operation is valid through every query op-
eration of different authorized query users. Even though we
have illustrated that the unauthorized user is unable to obtain
secret image encryption keys, this strategy may also contain
some insecure aspects. Therefore, we designed a different strat-
egy. The cloud first sends ER to the KMC after it finishing the
retrieval operation. The KMC will decrypt all images received
from the cloud and encrypt these images with the secret image
encryption key of the related authorized query user, and then
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Table 2
Retrieval index.
Image Owner Image ID
∑l
i=1 eai
∑l
i=1 ea
2
i
OID1 OID1 Image1 OID1 Image1 S um1 OID1 Image1 S um2
OID1 OID1 Image2 OID1 Image2 S um1 OID1 Image2 S um2
OID2 OID2 Image1 OID2 Image1 S um1 OID2 Image1 S um2
... ... ... ...
OIDn OIDn Image1 OIDn Image1 S um1 OIDn Image1 S um2
send these re-encrypted images NER to the cloud. Finally, the
cloud sends NER that are returned by the KMC to the authorized
query user. This new strategy can solve the above problem. Im-
ages returned by the cloud are encrypted by the secret image
encryption key of the authorized query user, even an unautho-
rized user obtains secret image encryption keys of image own-
ers, he is unable to crack these images correctly. Even though
the unauthorized user obtains the secret image encryption key
of an authorized query user, he can only access to crack images
that are returned to this authorized query user in this query. Fur-
thermore, the authorized query user will send a different image
encryption key to the KMC for each query. Even the unautho-
rized user can crack retrieval results of this query, he is unable
to crack retrieval results in the next query using the same key.
In our scheme, the unauthorized users are unabled to obtain se-
cret keys of image owners and authorized query users, therefore
our scheme can guarantee that image content privacy is unable
to be captured by unauthorized user.
6.1.2. Image feature privacy
We use the sum protocol in secure multi-party computa-
tion model proposed in [25] to encrypt image features. Jung
et al. [25] proposed three security models in his paper, shown
as Definition 1, 2 and 3.
Definition 1 (CDH problem inG) The Computational Diffie-
Hellman problem in a multiplicative group G with generator g
is defined as follows: given only g, ga, gb ∈ G where a, b ∈ Z,
compute gab without knowing a or b.
Definition 2 (DDH problem inG) The Computational Diffie-
Hellman problem in a multiplicative group G with generator g
is defined as follows: given only g, ga, gb, gc ∈ G where a, b, c
∈ Z, decide if gab = gc.
Definition 3 (CDH-Security inG) We say our privacy pre-
serving (sum or product) calculation is CDH-secure in G if any
Probabilistic Polynomial Time Adversary (PPTA) who cannot
solve the CDH problem with non-negligible chance has negli-
gible chance to infer any honest participants private value in G,
i.e., any PPTAs probability to solve the CDH problem  satis-
fies  < |1/p(κ)| for any polynomial p(·) where κ is the order of
the group G defined in the CDH problem.
In Jung’s paper, each participant Pi will receive the g
ri−1
2 and
gri+12 sent from participant Pi−1 and Pi+1; therefore, the unautho-
rized user may obtain gri−12 , g
ri+1
2 and g
ri
2 . They has proved that
their sum protocol is CDH-secure in G2 in this condition.
Theorem 6.1 Our scheme can protect image feature privacy
from being captured by cloud and unauthorized users.
Proof: In our scheme, image owner generates gri2 for each
dimension. The cloud and unauthorized users are enabled to
obtain gri−12 , g
ri+1
2 and g
ri
2 , thus our image feature privacy is also
CDH-secure in G2.
For an image feature fi = {a1, a2, ... , al}, the image owner
will calculate the fi2 = {a12, a22, ... , al2} and encrypt them to
obtain efi and efi2. The cipertext ai and ai2 are shown as follows:
eai = (1 + aip)Ri mod p2 = (1 + aip)g
(ri+1/ri−1)ri
2 mod p
2
eai2 = (1+ai2p)Ri mod p2 = (1+ai2p)g
(ri+1/ri−1)ri
2 mod p
2
If the unauthorized user wants to obtain ai, then he has to
solve the secret parameter Ri. Because the calculation process
of Ri is unknown to him, he is unable to solve Ri, and he cannot
obtain the plaintext ai.
At the same time, the parameter collection PC = {g2, {ri}}
can be chosen among different image features. This means if
we want to encrypt image feature f1, f 21 , f2, f
2
2 , we can choose
four different parameter collections PC to encrypt them. Even
if unauthorized users obtain one parameter collection PC, he is
only able to decrypt one image feature. However, unauthorized
users are unable to get the parameter collection PC. Moreover,
we can discard the parameter collection PC directly, as there is
no need to store it.
Furthermore, our scheme supports the update of image fea-
tures in cloud, which enables image owners update their en-
crypted image features at any time. Once an unauthorized user
obtains one parameter collection PC, he can only crack one
or more encrypted image features that are encrypted by this
parameter collection PC and if image owners update their en-
crypted image features in the cloud then the parameter collec-
tion PC that this unauthorized user obtains will be invalidation.
This unauthorized user need to obtain the new parameter col-
lection PC to crack encrypted image features. However, im-
age owners will not store the parameter collection PC and they
will not reveal the PC to unauthorized users, so unauthorized
users will not obtain the PC and they will be unable to crack
the plaintext of image features.
According to the above description, unauthorized users are
unable to obtain the plaintext of image features. Thus, our
scheme can protect the image feature privacy from being cap-
tured by unauthorized users.
6.2. Image similarity leakage in cloud
In our scheme, we assume that the cloud is ‘’honest but cu-
rious”, which means that he will execute the image retrieval
operation accurately and at the same time he will analyst the re-
lation or other information of images. In current research, there
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Fig. 2. The percentage that images will appear in each range of all returned
images.
always exists the image similarity leakage problem in the cloud
during the cloud executing image retrieval operation. Images in
the retrieval result are arranged by the similarity to query im-
age, which will reveal the similarity information of images to
the cloud.
A new distance to manage the similarity of images is pro-
posed in our scheme, which can solve the above problem. Fig. 2
shows the distribution of images that is similar to query images
in retrieval results when the cloud returns top 100 images. The
abscissa is the percentage that similar images distribute in the
retrieval results, and the ordinate is the probability that simi-
lar images distribute in the designated range. We can see that
when retrieving with the Euclidean distance, the percentage of
truly similar images appear in the top 10% of all retrieval result
images, which is very high, and the distribution percentage is
decreasing from beginning to end in retrieval results. The truly
similar image distribution of our scheme is uniform and similar
images are not likely to distribute at the beginning percentage
of the retrieval result, which will mislead the cloud to analyst
the similarity of the images. Because similar images are uni-
formly distributed in the retrieval results, the cloud may get the
wrong similarity relation. Therefore, our scheme can prevent
the image similarity leakage to the cloud.
7. Performance evaluation
In this section, we will introduce the performance evalu-
ation of our scheme, including experimental setting, evalua-
tion of retrieval accuracy, evaluation of time consumptions, and
evaluation of storage consumption.
7.1. Experimental setting
The corel images [26, 27] data set is usually used to verify
the experiment scheme in the research field of image retrieval.
It contains 100 categories each of which has 100 images. They
are selected as test images in our experiments. We choose 10
categories and generate 5 queries for each category, so there
Fig. 3. Retrieval accuracy of our scheme and Euclidean distance scheme.
are 50 queries in total to evaluate the retrieval accuracy. The
proposed scheme is implemented by C++ on Intel Core(TM)
Processor 2.7 GHZ.
7.2. Evaluation of retrieval accuracy
In the field of information retrieval, precision, recall ratio,
and F1-Measure are typical metrics to evaluate the retrieval re-
sults as formulated in Equations (10)- (12), where TP represents
the true positives, FP represents the false positives, and FN rep-
resents the false negatives. The precision and recall always rep-
resent the contrary variation tendency as shown in Fig. 3. We
can use the F1-Measure to make a comprehensive evaluation.
Fig. 3 shows that the retrieval accuracy of our scheme is about
10% lower than the scheme retrieval by Euclidean distance on
average. The retrieval recall of our scheme is about 5% lower
than the scheme retrieval by Euclidean distance on average.
Fig. 4 shows the F1-Measure of MIPP scheme and the scheme
retrieving with Euclidean distance. The result shows the F1-
Measure of our scheme is about 7% lower than the scheme
retrieving with Euclidean distance. As described in previous
sections, our scheme supports multiple image owners and can
preserve image similarity information in the cloud. Therefore,
the loss of retrieval accuracy of our scheme is the trade off these
two aspects.
P =
TP
TP + FP
(10)
R =
TP
TP + FN
(11)
F1 =
2PR
P + R
(12)
7.3. Evaluation of time consumptions
The time consumptions of our scheme primarily consist of
index construction time and secure image retrieval time, which
is described as follows:
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Fig. 4. F1-Measure of our scheme and Euclidean distance scheme.
(1) Index construction time.
When a new image owner participates in our scheme, the
image size will be increased. Fig. 5 shows the index con-
struction time is increasing with the larger size of images.
When the image size is 10,000, the index construction time
is approximately 7 minutes, which is tolerable. After con-
structing the retrieval index, the efficiency of secure image
retrieval in our scheme can be improved.
(2) Secure image retrieval time.
The time consumptions of plain image retrieval, encrypted
image retrieval with index, and encrypted image retrieval
without index are shown in Fig. 6, Fig. 7, and Fig. 8 respec-
tively. The results show that the larger image size, the more
time image retrieval consumes. The plain image retrieval
time of 10,000 images consumes approximately 1 second.
Encrypted image retrieval time without index of 10,000 im-
ages consumes approximately 6.8 minutes, while encrypted
image retrieval time with index of 10,000 images consumes
approximately 50ms. According to the above experimen-
tal data, we can calculate that index-based image retireval
takes approximately 8,160 times faster than non-indexed
image retrieval and index-based image retireval takes ap-
proximately 1,200 times faster than plain image retrieval
when retrieving in a collection of 10,000 images. We can
conclude that index-based encrypted image retrieval can
greatly improve retrieval efficiency compared with plain
image retrieval and non-indexed encrypted image retrieval.
The retrieval time-consuming result of index-based encrypted
image retrieval shows that the retrieval efficiency of our
scheme is appreciable.
7.4. Evaluation of storage consumption
The storage consumption includes index storage and en-
crypted image features storage consumption, described as fol-
lows:
(1) Index storage consumption.
Table 3
Storage consumption of 10000 images.
Encrypted Retrieval
Image Features Index
Storage consumption (KB) 3352278 267
We extract image features to represent images for similar-
ity calculation and construct retrieval indexes for improving
retrieval efficiency. The storage consumption of index table
is shown in Table 3. We can find that the retrieval index of
10,000 images costs approximately 267KB storage space.
Therefore, the storage consumption of index table is very
low.
(2) Encrypted image features storage consumption.
In order to preserve image features privacy, we outsource
encrypted image features to cloud. Table 3 shows that 10,000
encrypted image features consume approximately 3.2GB
storage space. Because encrypted image features are stored
in the cloud, which has high storage facilities, the storage
consumption of encrypted image features in our scheme is
tolerable.
8. Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a content-based multi-source en-
crypted image retrieval scheme in clouds with privacy protec-
tion. We encrypted image features with the secure multi-party
computation, which allowed image owners to encrypt image
features by using their own keys. We also proposed a new
method to measure the similarity of images that could avoid
revealing image similarity information to the cloud at a certain
extent. Theoretical analysis and experimental results showed
that our scheme enabled an accurate and efficient image re-
trieval over images gathered from multiple sources, while pro-
viding privacy guarantees. In the future work, we are to further
improve the image retrieval efficiency.
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